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Abstract
Recent advances in theoretical and experimental quantum computing bring us closer to scalable
quantum computing devices. Thismakes the need for protocols that verify the correct functionality of
quantumoperations timely and has led to the ﬁeld of quantumveriﬁcation. In this paper we address
key challenges tomake quantum veriﬁcation protocols applicable to experimental implementations.
We prove the robustness of the single server veriﬁable universal blind quantumcomputing protocol of
Fitzsimons andKasheﬁ (2012 arXiv:1203.5217) in themost general scenario. This includes the case
where the puriﬁcation of the deviated input state is in the hands of an adversarial server. The proved
robustness property allows the composition of this protocol with a device-independent state
tomography protocol that we give, which is based on the rigidity of CHSHgames as proposed by
Reichardt et al (2013Nature 496 456–60). The resulting composite protocol has lower round
complexity for the veriﬁcation of entangled quantum servers with a classical veriﬁer and, as we show,
can bemade fault tolerant.
1. Introduction
While the prospect of commercially available universal quantum computing is still distant, a number of
experiments involvingmulti-qubit systems have recently been developed. Irrespective of their applications,
these technologies requiremethods and tools for verifying the correctness of their operations. Assuming that
quantum computing ismore powerful than classical computing, a simulation-based approach for quantum
veriﬁcation of devices with sufﬁciently large number of qubits, becomes practically impossible. Aaronson and
Arkhipov showed in [3] that even a rudimentary quantum computer constructedwith linear-optical elements
cannot be efﬁciently simulated. Similarly, verifying the correct preparation of a general n qubit state via state
tomography also involves exponential overhead since it requires collecting statistics from 4n separate
observables [4].
The veriﬁcation of quantumdevices becomesmore complicatedwhen the functionality involves
cryptographic primitives. In these cases, incorrect operations could be the result of actions of an adversary. Thus
it becomes necessary to guarantee the security of the application under certain assumptions about the devices.
Ideally a protocol should remain secure even if the devices are faulty and partially controlled by adversaries. This
would lead to a solution that is device-independent and robust. However, generating such protocols has proven
difﬁcult. Even in quantumkey distribution, a complete proof of security for a device-independent protocol, in
the presence of noise, has been achieved only recently [5].
The issue of veriﬁcation needs to be resolved to be able to exploit successfully any future quantum
computers.Moreover, one expects that the ﬁrst large scale quantumdevices are unlikely to be personal
computers. Instead, theywill probably function as servers towhich clients can connect and request the
computation of some difﬁcult problem. The clientmay also require his computation to be private, i.e. require
that the server does not learn anything about it.We should therefore construct protocols that verify an arbitrary
delegated quantum computation and prove the security and correctness of this veriﬁcation technique.
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The approaches that have been so far successful are those based on interactive proof systems [6, 7], where a
trusted, computationally limited veriﬁer (also known as client, in a cryptographic setting) exchangesmessages
with an untrusted, powerful quantumprover, ormultiple provers (also known as servers). The veriﬁer attempts
to certify that, with high probability, the provers are performing the correct quantumoperations. Becausewe are
dealingwith a new formof computation, the veriﬁcation protocols, while based on established techniques are
fundamentally different from their classical counterparts. A number of quantumveriﬁcation protocols have
been developed, for different functionalities of devices and using a variety of different strategies to achieve
veriﬁcation [1, 2, 8–17]. The assumptionsmade depend on the speciﬁc target and desired properties of the
protocol. For example, if the emphasis is on creating an immediate practical implementation, then this should
be reﬂected in the technological requirements leading to a testable applicationwith current technology [17].
Alternatively, if themotivation is to prove a theoretical result, wemay relax some requirements such as efﬁcient
scaling [2]. An important open problem in the ﬁeld of quantum veriﬁcation, is whether a schemewith a fully
classical veriﬁer is possible [18, 19].We know, however, that veriﬁcation is possible in the following two
scenarios.
(1)A veriﬁer with minimal quantum capacity (ability to prepare random single qubits) and a single quantum
prover [1]. This is the Fitzsimons andKasheﬁ (FK) protocol.
(2)A fully classical veriﬁer and two non-communicating quantum provers that share entanglement [20]. This is
the Reichardt, Unger andVazirani (RUV) protocol.
One of our objectives is to obtain a device-independent (allowing untrusted quantumdevices) version of the
FKprotocol, by composing it with theRUVprotocol.
Here we shouldmake some remarks as towhat constitutes a device-independent protocol. A device-
independent protocol is a protocol where the honest participants do not trust their devices. They obtain only
classical outcomes and they assume theworse, i.e. that those devices were prepared by adversaries andwere
programmed to function in themost adversarial way. Thismeans they could be exploiting pre-shared
randomness with other devices and adversaries, in such away that any correlated attack is possible. In this view,
the veriﬁcation protocols of [1] and [21, 22] are not device-independent because the honest client has to assume
that the output of his device is not correlated with the device or actions of themalicious prover. In ourwork, we
assume a fully classsical client, that uses twomalicious but non-communicating provers. One of the provers is
only required to performmeasurements and so can be viewed as an untrustedmeasurement device, not
necessarily a full quantum computer. In the independent work of [23], a device independent veriﬁcation
protocol with a single prover and a client having an untrusted device, is proposed. These two settings are two
different views of the same situation. Since the device of the client is not trusted and is a black-box, it can be
modelled as a prover, that uses pre-shared randomness with the other prover to deceive the client.
Additional properties we aim to achieve from the composition of the FK andRUVprotocol are fault
tolerance (allowing noisy devices) and reduced round complexity. Composing protocols can indeed be fruitful
since it could lead to new protocols that inherit the advantages of both constituents. The universal
composabillity framework, allowing for secure compositions, has been successfully extended to the quantum
realm [24–26]. Recently, the security of single server veriﬁable universal blind quantum computing protocols
has been demonstrated in an abstract cryptographic framework [27] that is also known to be equivalent to the
simulation-based composability framework.However this setting does not fulﬁl the necessary requirements for
our composition. This is because, when combining a single server veriﬁcation scheme (FK)with an entangled
server scheme (RUV), there exists the possibility of correlated attacks, which are not explicitly treated in the
composability framework. Such attacks can occurwhen an untrusted server’s strategy is correlatedwith
deviations in the protocol’s input state. Our robustness result resolves this issue in the stand alone composition
setting and the same technique could potentially be extended to the composable framework of [27], thus
resolving the problemof correlated attacks.
The type of composition thatwe require is sequential.We take the output of the ﬁrst protocol and use it as
input for the second.However, in general, the output of the ﬁrst protocol is not necessarily an acceptable input
for the second protocol. In particular, since the veriﬁcation protocols are probabilistic, their outputs typically
deviate by a small amount from the ideal one. Thus, it is necessary that the second protocol remain secure even if
the input is slightly deviated from the ideal one.Moreover, wemake sure that adversaries cannot exploit any
correlations between the deviated input and their strategy to compromise the security of the protocol. Therefore
to securely compose the protocols, we need to address these new type of attacks. Themain results of this paper
can be summarized as follows.
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(1)We prove that the FK protocol is strongly robust, see theorem 1. First, we show that FK can tolerate inputs
which deviate from their ideal values by a small amount, see lemma 7.However, for compositionwith other
protocols a stronger property is needed.We therefore proceed to show that the FKprotocol is robust even
when the deviated input is correlated with an external systempossessed by an adversary (for example the
provers’ private systems in the RUVprotocol), see lemma 8.
(2)An immediate consequence of the robustness theorem is that we can construct a composite protocol
combining RUVwith FK. The required input states for the FKprotocol are prepared via the state tomography
sub-protocol of RUV.Our composite protocol inherits the device independence property of RUV, see
theorem 3. Additionally, sincewe do not require the full RUVprotocol, the composite protocol also has an
improved round complexity.Moreover, since one of the provers is only required to run the state tomography
sub-protocol, it only needs to performmeasurements. Thismeans that only one of the provers should be
considered a quantum computer (the one running the quantum computation), whereas the other can be
viewed as an untrusted quantummeasurement device.
(3)Lastly, we address the distinction between robustness and fault tolerance and show how the FK protocol can
bemade fault tolerant, therebymaking our proposed composite approach fault tolerant as well. Herewe
should note that in [1], fault-tolerant computation and quantum error correcting codes (QEC)were used,
but with speciﬁc aim to boost the security of the protocol frompolynomial to exponential. In particular, the
trapswere not encoded usingQEC, and thus the protocol was not tolerant to error-prone devices, since single
faults on trap qubits would lead to an honest run being aborted. Aswewill see the FK protocol can bemade
fault-tolerant, butmore care is needed.
In section 1.1we give some preliminaries. In section 2we present themain results, that we summarized
above, and outline their proofs. In particular we give robustness in section 2.1, composition in section 2.2 and
fault tolerance in section 2.3. Further details of the proofs are given in section 3 for robustness, in section 4 for
composition and in section 5 for fault tolerance.We conclude in section 6.
1.1. Preliminaries
Weﬁrst introduce the relevant concepts used in describing veriﬁcation protocols and then brieﬂy present the
two protocols wewill built on (FK andRUV).
1.1.1. Interactive proof systems
As explained in [6, 10], a language  is said to admit an interactive proof system if there exists a computationally
unbounded prover  and a BPP veriﬁer  , such that for any x ∈ ,  convinces  that x ∈ with probability
2
3
⩾ . Additionally, when x ∈ ,  convinces  that x ∈ with probability 1
3
⩽ .Mathematically, we have the
following two conditions3.
• Completeness: Pr ( ↔ accepts x x ) 2
3
∣ ∈ ⩾ .
• Soundness: Pr ( ↔ accepts x x ) 1
3
∣ ∈ ⩽ .
The set of languageswhich admit such an interactive proof systemdeﬁne the complexity class IP.We are
interested in the case when the prover is a polynomial-time quantum computer (i.e. a BQPmachine). In [10],
theﬁrst deﬁnition of such a quantum interactive proof systemwas given, whichwe use here:
Deﬁnition 1 [10]. Quantumprover interactive proof (QPIP) is an interactive proof systemwith the following
properties.
(i) The prover is computationally restricted to BQP.
(ii) The veriﬁer is a hybrid quantum-classical machine. Its classical part is a BPPmachine. The quantum part is
a register of c qubits (for some constant c), onwhich the prover can perform arbitrary quantumoperations.
At any given time, the veriﬁer is not allowed to possessmore than c qubits. The interaction between the
quantum and classical parts is the usual one: the classical part controls which operations are to be
performed on the quantum register, and outcomes ofmeasurements of the quantum register can be used as
input to the classicalmachine.
3
Note that completeness can be viewed as the probability of the veriﬁer acceptingwhen the prover is honest. Similarly, soundness is the
probability of accepting, when the prover is dishonest.
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(iii) There are two communication channels: one quantum and one classical.
The completeness and soundness conditions are identical to the IP conditions.
We are also interested in interactive protocols that usemore than one prover. There are only two differences,
ﬁrst that the veriﬁer can interact withmultiple provers instead of just one, and second that the provers are not
allowed to communicate. The conditions for completeness and soundness remain unchanged. The analogous
complexity class that involvesmultiple provers is calledmulti-prover interactive proof system and denotedMIP
[28]. It is deﬁned as the set of all languages which admit an interactive proof systemwith one ormore non-
communicating provers. If the number of provers isﬁxed to be k, the corresponding complexity class isMIP[k].
A closely related class isMIP* where themultiple non-communicating provers share entangled states.
In all of these cases, the veriﬁer is essentially delegating a difﬁcult computation to the prover(s). This
computation can be universal with respect to the computationmodel of the prover(s). In our case, thismeans
universal for polynomial-time quantum computations. The number of classicalmessages exchanged between
the veriﬁer and the prover, throughout the run of the protocol, as a function of the input size is known as the
round complexity of the protocol.
1.1.2. Quantum protocols
Throughout this subsection, we assume the reader is familiar with the teleportation-based andmore generally
measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC)models, described in detail in [29, 30].
Weﬁrst summarize the FKprotocol [1]which is aQPIPprotocol. It is also known as unconditionally secure,
veriﬁable, universal blind quantum computing. The protocol is ‘blind’whichmeans that no information about
the computation is leaked to the prover, apart from its size. This property can be exploited by allowing the
veriﬁer to insert hidden ‘traps’within the computation. The traps are deterministic tests which the veriﬁer can
perform in order to verify that the prover is not deviating from the protocol. Blindness ensures that the traps are
indistinguishable from the computation.
The basic idea of this protocol is that the veriﬁer prepares and sends qubits to the prover. The prover
entangles these qubits and then performs adaptivemeasurements (sending themeasurement outcomes to the
veriﬁer) that will overall implement a certain unitary operation, as in theMBQCmodel of computation. The
traps are single isolated qubits, disentangled from the rest of the computation, andwhenmeasured in suitable
bases give deterministic outcomes that are known to the veriﬁer (but not to the prover). Since the prover is
completely blind and does not knowwhich qubits are traps andwhich are part of the actual computation, any
attempt to cheat has some probability to affect the trap and thus be detected.
The FKprotocol is based on a universal resource state for theMBQCmodel, known as the dotted-complete
graph state. The details of this resource state are not crucial for understanding this paper, apart from the fact that,
as part of the FKprotocol, the appropriate operators are performed by the untrusted server to prepare this
generic state. In particular, a series of controlled-Z operators are performed by the server, according to the
dotted-complete graph structure, for entangling the individual qubits prepared in advance by the veriﬁer. These
initial qubits, that are sometimes referred to as the input of the FKprotocol, are sent to the server at the ﬁrst stage
of the protocol. This fact is used to prove some basic properties needed for ourmain robustness result, see
theorem2. Therefore, for the purpose of completeness, we state here the deﬁnition of the dotted-complete
graph state, taken from [1], see alsoﬁgure 1.
Deﬁnition 2 [1]. LetKN denote the complete graph ofN vertices. Deﬁne the dotted-complete graph, denoted as
K˜N , to be a graphwhere every edge inKN is replacedwith a new vertex connected to the two vertices originally
joined by that edge.We call the quantum state corresponding to K˜N the dotted-complete graph state. Thismulti-
partite entangled state is prepared by replacing every vertexwith a qubit in the state ∣ + 〉 and applying a
controlled-Z operator for every edge in the graph.
Figure 1.An example of a complete graph,K6, and its corresponding dotted-complete graph K˜6.
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The family of dotted-complete graph states is universal for quantum computation.Moreover, any other
graph state could be obtained froma large enough dotted-complete graph state by applying the appropriate
Paulimeasurements over some of the vertices (the ones shown inwhite, inﬁgure 1). Concretely, in order to
construct any desired graph ofN vertices from a dotted-complete graph K˜N , PauliYmeasurements are
performed in order to keep a speciﬁc edge, and PauliZmeasurements in order to remove it (alternatively, one
could use the states 0∣ 〉, 1∣ 〉 for the edges which should be removed, instead of performing a PauliZ
measurement). This can be done blindly in order to hide the target graph. The detailed construction is not
important for the rest of this paper and hence omitted (see section 5 in [1]).We give a brief description of FK,
shownhere as protocol 1.
Protocol 1. Fitzsimons, KasheﬁQPIP protocol from [1].
Assumptions
The veriﬁerwants to delegate a quantum computation described by the graphG and speciﬁcmeasurement angles iϕ {0, 4 ... 7 4}π π∈
chosen to deﬁne a desired computation. He chooses a security parameter d and encodes this graph into the topological error correcting
scheme of Raussendorf et al [31], that can correct or detect errors withweight less than d. The encoded graph,  , will haveN qubits. He
then considers a randomhidden partitioning of the vertices of the dotted-complete graph N3͠ into three subgraphs: the computation
graph  , and two different types of isolated traps which the veriﬁerwill use in order to test the prover’s honesty in performingmeasure-
ments. Allmeasurements are performed in theXY-plane.
Protocol
(1)Veriﬁer prepares and sends the N N3 (3 1) 2+ qubits to the prover (the number of vertices in N3͠ ). These consist of dummyqubits
which are either 0∣ 〉 or 1∣ 〉 (isolating their neighbouring vertices from the rest of the computation) and computation or trap qubits which
are of the form ( 0 e 1 )1
2
i∣ + 〉 = ∣ 〉 + ∣ 〉θ θ , where {0, 4 ... 7 4}θ π π∈ .
(2) The prover entangles the qubits according to the structure of the N3͠ graph by applying controlled-Z operations between any pair of
vertices that are connectedwith an edge.
(3) For each qubit i, the veriﬁer computes themeasurement angle ri i i iδ θ ϕ π= + ′ + , where iϕ′ is the adapted version of the computation
angle iϕ , and ri is a randomly chosen bit {0, 1}. Adapted computation angles are used to account for corrections frompreviousmeasure-
ments. Themeasurement angles iϕ , for the trap qubits, are randomly ﬁxed to be 0 or π. However, due to blindness provided by the initial
iθ rotations in the preparation of individual qubits (step 1 above), the value of iδ is uniformly distributed over the set {0, 4 ... 7 4}π π . The
veriﬁer sends thesemeasurement angles one by one to the prover. The provermeasures each corresponding qubit in the i∣ + 〉δ , i∣ − 〉δ
basis, and sends his reply bi to the veriﬁer.
(4) The veriﬁer accepts if for all trap qubits, the reportedmeasurement outcome bt is the same as the expected outcome rt.
According to deﬁnition 1 the quantum channel between veriﬁer and prover is one-way (from the veriﬁer to
the prover).Moreover, the constant c, representing the number of qubits that the veriﬁer can possess at any
given time, is exactly one.We refer the reader to [1] for amore in depth description of the protocol and its
associated concepts. However, we recall the key properties of the protocol in the following lemma.
Lemma1.Assuming the veriﬁer wants to delegate the computation of a circuit of sizeN, the FK protocol hasO N( )2
round complexity and usesO N( )2 qubits with completeness being exactly 1 while the soundness is upper bounded by
(2 3)
d2
5
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥, where d is the security parameter.
Proof. It is clear fromprotocol 1 that the total number of qubits used in the protocol is N N3 (3 1) 2+ , whereN
is the number of qubits for the encoded graph . Additionally, we have the same number of rounds of classical
communication, corresponding to themeasurements of qubits in the dotted-complete graph (eachmeasure-
ment requires three classical bits to specify themeasurement angle and 1 bit to specify the outcome). Both the
overall round complexity and the required quantum resources are thusO N( )2 .
As described in protocol 1, the veriﬁer accepts if and only if all trapmeasurements succeed. This is always the
case if the prover is honest and follows the instructions, since the trapmeasurements are deterministic.
Therefore, the probability that the veriﬁer accepts when the prover is honest is exactly 1 (completeness). On the
other hand, it is shown in [1] that in the case of classical output, the protocol is (2 3)
d2
5
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥-veriﬁable,meaning the
soundness is upper bounded by (2 3)
d2
5
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥. □
Nextwe summarize the RUVprotocol [2] which is aMIP* protocol. It relies on the rigidity of CHSHgames
[20, 32] to test the honesty of the provers (see traps at the FKprotocol), and on gate teleportation to perform the
computation. In particular, the veriﬁer directs the provers to perform a series of localmeasurements of their
parts of the shared entangled states. The purpose of this is to check for statistical violations of Bell’s inequality. At
the same time, the veriﬁermakes the provers teleport quantum states into gates in order to performhis desired
quantum computation [20]. Importantly, the veriﬁer alternates between these strategies in such away that the
5
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provers are not aware (they are blind) inwhich strategy theirmeasurement belongs.Moreover, the two provers
cannot use previous results in order to deviate from the protocol (i.e. there is no adaptive cheating strategy). This
is summarized as protocol 2. Due to the rigidity of the CHSHgames, as proved in [2], the veriﬁer can determine
if the two provers are being honest or not from the statistical outcomes. To ensure the veriﬁcation of universal
computations, the resource preparation stage of the protocol will preparemultiple copies of the states:
{ }( )P HP GY P Q P Q I X Y Z0 , ( ) * , ( ) * , CNOT * * : , { , , , } .2 2 2,4 2 4ψ ψ ψ ψ∣ 〉 ⊗ ∈
Here, *ψ∣ 〉denotes the Bell state 00 11
2
∣ 〉+ ∣ 〉 which is shared among the two provers. In fact the provers share
multiple copies of *ψ∣ 〉, each prover having one qubit from each Bell pair.Without loss of generality, we can
assume that prover 1 has the ﬁrst qubit and prover 2 has the second qubit. TheHadamard, Phase and controlled-
Not gates (denoted as H G{ , , CNOT}) constitute a universal gate set for quantum computation. The subscript
indices indicate onwhich qubits the gate acts. An arbitrary quantum circuit is thus simulated by repeatedly doing
gate teleportations, while keeping the computation blind from the two provers the entire time.
Lemma2.Assuming the veriﬁer wants to delegate the computation of a circuit of size n, the round complexity of the
RUVprotocol isO n( )c , where there exists some constant c, such that c 8192⩾ .
Proof.Todetermine an upper bound for the round complexity we only need to inspect the number of rounds of
CHSHgames, since the protocol randomly alternates between this and the other three subprotocols. As shown
in protocol 2, the veriﬁer playsN sets of CHSHgameswith the two provers. Each set consists of qns games and
n ns 64⩾ . Additionally, it is required that N qn( )s 1⩾ α− , where n n2 64⩾α , so 128α ⩾ . These conditions are
necessary for the correctness of the state tomography and process tomography subprotocols [20].We then have
that N dn8128⩾ , where d is a constant of the form d q 1= α− . This is the number of sets of CHSH games and
hence the number of required games is lower bounded by n8192. It follows that the number of rounds isO n( )c ,
where c 8192⩾ . Note that by ‘lower bounded’we refer to the casewhen all of the CHSH statistics are consistent
and the veriﬁer does not reject. In the case of inconsistent statistics, the veriﬁer can reject before playing n8192
games. □
The subprotocols of the RUVprotocol are themselves veriﬁcation protocols as proved in [20]. The
subprotocol that wewill use is the state tomography protocol. As part of the RUVprotocol, it is used to prepare
resource states which areXZ-determined, i.e. states that are uniquely determined by their traces againstX andZ
operators. To compose the RUVwith the FKprotocol wewill use amodiﬁed version of the state tomography
subprotocol, so that we can prepare all states that are allowed inputs for the FK protocol.Wewill give the
modiﬁed protocol in the next section.
Protocol 2.Reichardt, Unger, VaziraniMIP* protocol from [20] (for two provers).
Assumptions
The veriﬁer delegates a quantum circuit of size n to two quantumprovers. Let n n ns 2 64= ⩾α , q=11, ng=qns, N ng 1⩾ α− and n1 (6 )8δ = α .
The two provers shareNngBell states.
Protocol
The veriﬁer alternates randomly between four subprotocols. He chooses theﬁrst threewith probability (1 ) 3)δ− and the last onewith
probability δ.
(1)CHSH games.The veriﬁer refereesN sets of sequential CHSHgames, each consisting of ng games between the provers. He rejects if they
win less than:
Nn Nn Nncos ( 8)
1
2 2
log( )g g g2 π −
of the games.
(2) State tomography.The veriﬁer chooses K N[ ]∈ uniformly at random and referees K 1− sets of CHSH games.He sends the questions
from theKth set to prover 1, while running a state tomography protocol with prover 2. In this protocol prover 2 is asked to prepare q-qubit
resource states bymeasuring his halves of the shared Bell states. This will collapse prover 1ʼs states to the same q-qubit resource states up to
corrections. The veriﬁer checks this using theCHSHmeasurement outcomes fromprover 1. These outcomes tomographically determine
the states that are being prepared. He rejects if the tomography statistics are inconsistent.
(3)Process tomography.The veriﬁer chooses K N[ ]∈ uniformly at random and referees K 1− sets of CHSHgames.He sends the questions
from theKth set to prover 2, while running a process tomography protocol with prover 1. In this protocol prover 1 is asked to performBell
measurements on his halves of the shared Bell states. The veriﬁer checks this using theCHSHmeasurement outcomes fromprover 2.He
rejects if the tomography statistics are inconsistent.
(4)Computation.The veriﬁer chooses K N[ ]∈ uniformly at randomand refereed K 1− sets of CHSH games. In theKth game he runs a
state tomography protocol with prover 2 and a process tomography protocol with prover 1. The combination of these two achieves
computation via gate teleportation.
6
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2.Main results
2.1. Robustness
Theﬁrst result we prove is that the FKprotocol is robust with respect to small variations in the input.
Throughout this paper, by ‘input’we are referring to the quantum states that the veriﬁer sends to the prover and
not the computation input.Without loss of generality we can assume that the desired computation that will be
delegated to the server has the ﬁxed classical input 0, 0… . Dealing with arbitrary classical or quantum input is
straightforward, as explained in [1], andmakes no difference for our result. Hence, for the rest of this paperwe
deﬁne the input state of the FKprotocol to be the tensor product of the individual qubits prepared by the veriﬁer,
comprising the dotted-complete graph before the prover applies controlled-Z to entangle them (these include
the computation, trap and dummyqubits).
The fact that FK is robustmeans that the protocol’s input state can be deviated from its ideal value by some
small amount and the protocol will continue to function. In particular, this input state could be the output of
some other protocol, provided that this statewas close to its ideal value. As wewill see in the next subsection, the
RUVprotocol is capable of such a preparation.We start by formally deﬁning robustness in this context.
Deﬁnition 3 (Robustness). A veriﬁcation protocol with quantum input is robust if, given that the protocol input
is ϵ-close in trace distance to the ideal input, in the limit where 0ϵ → the completeness and soundness bounds
remain unchanged.
Mathematically, if we denote themulti-qubit input state as ρ, and the pure states comprising the ideal input
as iπ , where i goes from1 to the number of qubits, we have that:
. (1)
i
i
Tr
ρ π ϵ∥ − ⊗ ∥ ⩽
Note that ρ is of the same dimension as i iπ⊗ as it does not contain any ancilla qubits from the environment.
Given the deﬁnition of robustness, we prove that:
Theorem1.The FK protocol is robust and given an input which is ϵ-close to its ideal value, the completeness is lower
bounded by 1 2ϵ− and the soundness bound changes by atmostO ( )ϵ .
Becausewe are tracing out the environment, which could be controlled by an adversary, the security of the
protocol, with a deviated input state, needs to be re-established.We highlight this in the following proof sketch
of theorem1:
Proof sketch.Weﬁrst examine soundness which considers the case of a dishonest prover. Intuitively, when the
prover ismalevolent, hewill try to convince the veriﬁer to accept an incorrect outcome and thus deviate from the
correct protocol. However, as shown in [1], nomatter howmuch the prover deviates, the probability for the
veriﬁer to accept a wrong outcome is bounded. If the input to the protocol is already deviated from the ideal, one
could expect that the soundness bound remains unchanged. The effect of a deviated input could be incorporated
in the deviated actions of the prover. This is indeed the casewhen the input is uncorrelatedwith any external
system andwe can express the deviation as aCPTPmap (see lemma 7 for detailed proof).
In the general case, however, the deviated input could be correlatedwith subsystems controlled by
adversaries. This deviation could be used by the prover to improve his cheating probability.Mathematically this
ismanifested by the fact that the prover’s action in the presence of initial correlations is not in general a trace
preservingmap. It can be expressed as a linear combination of aCPTP deviation and an inhomogeneous term
which could be either positive or negative as shown in the [33]. In this case, we use the ϵ-closeness of the input
state to derive a bound of orderO ( )ϵ for the normof the inhomogeneous term. From linearity, and using the
previous argument it follows that in the general case the soundness bound changes by atmostO ( )ϵ (see
lemma 8 for detailed proof).
In the case of completeness, we are assuming the prover is honest. If we start with an ϵ-close input state,
because of the linearity of the operators involved, wewill end upwith an output state that isO ( )ϵ -close to the
ideal output (see lemma 9 for detailed proof). □
A similar approach to lemma 7was used in [34] for deﬁning approximate blindness, and in [27] to prove
universal composability for blind quantum computing protocols. However, to our knowledge, these results are
not strong enough to cover the requirements for the compositionwith the RUVprotocol. In [34] only the
blindness property was examinedwhile verifying the computationwas not considered. In [27] they considered
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local-veriﬁability which does not take into account for example, the possibility of correlated attacks such as those
that are possible when the two provers have a prearranged correlated strategy.
2.2. Composition
One of ourmain objectives is to construct a device independent version of the FKprotocol. Theﬁrst step, was to
show that FK is robust. This property guarantees that if we have an input state that is only approximately the
ideal one, the protocol continues towork.We can nowbreak the task of achieving device independent FK into
two parts, whichwe need to compose sequentially.
(1)State preparation—use a device independent protocol to prepare on the prover’s side a state which is ϵclose to
the FK input.
(2)Veriﬁed delegated computation—run the FK protocol with the prover that has the ϵ-close input state (since
robustness allows this).
The advantage of this technique is that we are free to use any protocol for state preparation as long aswe have
the guarantee of ϵ-closeness. This is due to our strong robustness result, which shows that FKwill work even if
the deviation in the prepared state is correlatedwith the prover’s cheating strategy in the delegated computation
stage. In this paper, we achieve state preparation using the device-independent state tomography sub-protocol
of RUV. This sub-protocol has the ϵ-closeness property that we require, as explained in [20]. The resulting
composite protocol will have a better round complexity than the full RUVprotocol for the veriﬁcation of
quantum computations. The complexity can be improved further if amore efﬁcient state preparation protocol is
used. Recently, in an independent work that simultaneously appearedwith our arxiv version, amore efﬁcient
scheme for state preparation is proposed that is based on a self-testing approach [23] rather than the rigidity of
CHSHgames [20].
Weﬁrst clarify some details of the RUVprotocol, which are essential in understanding howour composite
protocol will work. RUVuses the rigidity property of CHSHgames to determine that the provers sharemultiple
copies of the Bell state ( 00 11 ) 2Φ∣ 〉 = ∣ 〉 + ∣ 〉+ , which is XZ-determined. They can then use XZ state
tomography to verify the preparation of any other XZ-determined state. In particular, they use it to
tomographically verify the preparation of a set of states which can be used to performuniversal computation.
They also describe how it is possible to extend the protocol in order to have full tomographywith theY operator
aswell [20].However, because they are using the Φ∣ 〉+ Bell state, it is only possible toﬁx theY operator up to a
sign change. That is, the provers can always choose tomeasure in either theY or Y− bases without being
detected (this corresponds to complex conjugating the states with respect to their representations in the
computational basis). In fact this problemhas been noticed by others aswell [12, 35]. As explained in [20], it is
possible to force the provers to consistently choose eitherY or Y− for theirmeasurements. Thismakes the
resulting state prepared by state tomography close to either the ideal state or the complex conjugate of the ideal
state.
Atﬁrst glance it would seem that this could be problematic for the FKprotocol.Wewould have to show that
running the FKprotocol with an input state that is close to the complex conjugated version of the ideal input
would be detected by the veriﬁer. Intuitively this is the case, since trap qubits are in theXY-plane and complex
conjugating themwould lead to differentmeasurement outcomes.Wewill not prove this and instead provide a
simpler solution.
The problem stems from the fact that we are using the XZ-determined Φ∣ 〉+ state. Let us instead consider the
state ( 01 10 ) 2Ψ∣ 〉 = ∣ 〉 + ∣ 〉+ . Using theorem2 from [20], and the fact that Ψ∣ 〉+ has stabilizer generator set
X X Y Y{ , }⊗ ⊗ which belongs to I X Y{ , , } 2⊗ wehave that this state isXY-determined.
Theorem2 [20].A stabilizer state is determined by any of its sets of stabilizer generators.
In principle it is possible to run a formof theRUVprotocol inwhichwe choose theCHSHgames such that
we rigidly determine that the provers sharemultiple copies of the Bell state Ψ∣ 〉+ instead of Φ∣ 〉+ . Analogous to
the previous case, the extended formof the protocol would thenﬁx theZ operator up to a sign change (instead of
theY operator). Thismeans that the provers can always perform a reﬂection about the XY planewith no
noticeable changes. However, the XY plane states are invariant under such a reﬂection.We can therefore use this
to prepare the inputwhichwill be used by the FKprotocol. The only problemwe encounter is that we also
require the preparation of 0∣ 〉 and 1∣ 〉 states which act as dummyqubits in the FK protocol [1]. As described in
protocol 1 these dummyqubits aremeasured in order to ‘break’ the dotted-complete graph into the
computation graph and the two trap graphs. The problem is that the XY plane reﬂection has the effect of
ﬂipping the computational basis states (state 0∣ 〉becomes 1∣ 〉 and state 1∣ 〉becomes 0∣ 〉). However this deviation
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(ﬂip) has to be applied globally otherwise it affects the statistics of theCHSHgame and thus the veriﬁer rejects
[20]. Such a globalﬂip is detected by the FKprotocol. A formal proof is given in lemma 10, section 4, while below
we give a sketch of the proof.
In the honest scenario for the FKprotocol, themeasurement of a dummyqubit in state 1∣ 〉 introduces an
additionalZ correction to its neighbouring qubits (this is becausewe are using the controlled-Z operation for
entangling qubits). Hence in amalicious setting the effect that aﬂip has on a trap qubit with an odd number of
neighbouring dummyqubits, leads to an extraZ operation. Such aZﬂip changes a ∣ + 〉θ state to ∣ − 〉θ . Thus,
themeasurement of this trap qubit will deterministically fail and the veriﬁerwill detect this. On the other hand,
since the veriﬁer chooses the input, he can always pad the computation such that the overall graph has trap
qubits with an odd number of neighbour dummyqubits. This is due to the fact that in a dotted-complete graphs
(deﬁnition 2), some of the trapswill have N 1− neighbouring dummyqubits. Therefore, if the size of the input
computationN is odd, the veriﬁer need only pad the computation size to become N 1+ .
Nowwe are in a position to construct the composite protocol which composes RUVwith FK.We give a
modiﬁed version of the state tomography protocol of RUV (see protocol 3). Proof that protocol 3 is valid
veriﬁcation protocol is given in section 4. The purpose of thismodiﬁcation is to veriﬁably prepare theminimal
resource states which are subsequently used as inputs for the FK protocol.
Protocol 3.Modiﬁed state tomography protocol.
Assumptions
Let S {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1),1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
= − − (0, 1, 1)}1
2
− .
LetMv be a 2 outcome projectivemeasurement deﬁned by the projectors: I v X Y Z( · ( , , ))
1
2
+ ⃗ and I v X Y Z( · ( , , ))1
2
− ⃗ .
Let the tuple a b S S( , )⃗ ⃗ ∈ × denote themeasurementsMa for prover 1 andMb for prover 2 that they need to perform on their halves on
an entangled state when instructed by the veriﬁer. Sets of such tuples deﬁneCHSHgames. For example the set
{(1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)} { (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1)}1
2
1
2
× − deﬁnes the XZ CHSHgame.Given S, there are six such sets of CHSH games (two
XZ , two XY and two YZ ) [20]. For a suitable numbering of these games, letCHSHi be the ithCHSHgame, i {1 ,... 6}∈ .
Protocol
The veriﬁer alternates uniformly at randombetween the following subprotocols:
(1)CHSH games.Veriﬁer referees N6 sets of sequential CHSHgames, such that each group ofN sets is one of the six possible CHSH types of
games. Each set consists of ng games between prover 1 and prover 2. For each group ofNCHSHgames the veriﬁer rejects if the two provers
win less than:
Nn Nn Nncos ( 8)
1
2 2
log( )g g g2 π −
of the games.
(2) State tomography.Veriﬁer chooses K N[ ]∈ uniformly at random and also randomly chooses CHSHi as one of the six possible CHSH
games. Then he referees K 1− sets of CHSHi games, sending the questions from theKth set to prover 1, while running a state tomography
protocol with prover 2. In this protocol prover 2 is asked to prepare resource states bymeasuring his halves of the shared Bell states. This
will collapse prover 1ʼs states to the same resource states up to corrections. In the context of composition, these resource states will
constitute the FK input. The veriﬁer uses themeasurement outcomes of prover 1 to tomographically check this preparation.He rejects if
the tomography statistics are inconsistent. In the end, if the veriﬁer accepts, he concludes that with high probability prover 1 has a state
which is close in trace distance to the tensor product of resource states. The formal statement of this fact is given in theorem5, taken from
[20], andmore precisely in equation (42) from lemma12.
The composite protocol, given as protocol 4, is the sequential composition of themodiﬁed state tomography
of protocol 3with both provers followed by the FKprotocol with prover 1.Note that since prover 1 is involved in
both state tomography as well as the FKprotocol, the strong version of the robustness property is required. This
is to address the effect of any potential correlated attacks where provers 1 and 2 have agreed in advance on a
strategy. The deviations of prover 2, in the preparation stage, could be correlatedwith the deviations of prover 1
during the computation stage (FK). This is the ﬁrst rigorous proof of a protocol that involves lifting the FK
protocol to the entangled provers setting. Additionally note that prover 2 is only required to performquantum
measurements and therefore can be viewed as an untrustedmeasurement device. Hence our protocol is a device-
independent single-server veriﬁcation protocol unlike RUVwhich is amulti-server protocol.We give here the
correctness and soundness of this protocol and show that it ismore efﬁcient than theRUVprotocol (theorem3)
while in section 4we give the proof of this theorem.
Protocol 4.Composite veriﬁcation protocol.
(1) Run themodiﬁed state tomography protocol (protocol 3).
(2) From the states prepared by this protocol on prover 1ʼs side, select the input for FK and run the FK protocol with prover 1. (Protocol 1.)
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Theorem3.Assuming the veriﬁer wants to delegate the computation of a quantum circuit of size n, protocol 4 is a
MIP* veriﬁcation protocol having completeness lower bounded by O n1 ( )1 128− − , soundness upper bounded by
O n( ) ( )2
3
1 12d25
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥ + − , where d is the security parameter of the FK protocol, and round complexityO n( )c , where there
exists some constant c such that c 2048> .
While the obtained round complexity is an improvement over RUV (lemma 2) it is still far frompractical.
However, we believe our approach serves as a proof of principle, that this type of composition can be beneﬁcial.
It also highlights where improvements could bemade. It is the state tomography subprotocol that increases the
round complexity, while the FKprotocol has a relatively low complexity4. The detailed proofs are given in
section 4.
2.3. Fault tolerance
In constructing our composite veriﬁcation protocol, we used the robustness of the FKprotocol. Our last result is
to characterize the difference between robustness and fault tolerance and to show that the FKprotocol can be
made fault tolerant using a topological error correcting code. Note that in [1] a quantum error correcting code is
used to further bound the deviation in the prover’s cheating strategy and thus boost the soundness parameter of
the protocol. However, in that case trapswere not encoded and so in the presence of noise and faulty devices, the
acceptance probability, even for an honest prover, would decrease considerably, as wewill show.We remedy this
problem in our fault tolerant version of the FKprotocol. Consequently, our composite protocol can also be
made fault tolerant provided that the state tomography part is run on top of an error correcting code.
Asmentioned before robustness is a protocol’s ability to continue to function given a deviated input. Fault
tolerance is when a protocol functions correctly in the presence of error prone devices. The essential assumption
for robustness is that the actual (multi-qubit) input is ϵ-close to its ideal value. Fault tolerant protocols, on the
other hand, assume that errors can occur at each individual qubit. The faulty devices are usually represented by
the action of a partially depolarizing channel: p I X Y Z(1 )[ ] ([ ] [ ] [ ])
p
3
 = − + + + . Here p is the probability
of error, and the square brackets indicate the action of an operator. This leads to the following observation:
Lemma3. Let i
n
i1σ ρ= ⊗ = be a system of n qubits. Assume each qubit goes through a partially depolarizing channel having probability of error p 0> . Let the state of the system, after all qubits have passed through the channel, be
( )i
n
i1 σ ρ′ = ⊗ = .We have that min np(1, )Trσ σ∥ − ′∥ ⩽ and there exist states σ for which 1Trσ σ∥ − ′∥ = .
Thismeans that the deviation of an n-qubit system from the ideal input is not bounded by some constant
amount. This is intuitively clear, since by addingmore qubits, we introducemore errors and the state of the
composite system is further from its intended value. In contrast to this, when considering robustness, the
distance between the actual and ideal state is bounded by an arbitrarily small quantity.Wewill now address how
canwe do veriﬁcation in an error prone setting.
Lemma4.Assumewe run the FK protocol withNT traps and each qubit is subject to the action of a partially
depolarizing channel  having probability of error p 0> . Given the simplifying assumption that if a qubit is changed
(through the action of anX, Y or Z operator) it will produce an incorrect measurement outcome, the completeness of
this protocol is upper bounded by p(1 )NT− .
Protocol 5. Fault tolerant FKprotocol.
Assumptions
The veriﬁerwants to compute the execution of ameasurement graphG having n qubits. Both the veriﬁer and prover’s devices are subject to
noisemodelled as a partially depolarizing channel acting on the preparation of the qubits and the application of the quantumgates. For
single qubits the channel is described by:
p I
p
X Y Z(1 )[ ]
3
([ ] [ ] [ ]). (2)1 = − + + +
And for two qubit states by:
p I I
p
I X Z Z(1 )[ ]
15
([ ] [ ]). (3)2 = − ⊗ + ⊗ + ⋯ + ⊗
Additionally assume p pcorrect⩽ , where pcorrect is a threshold such that depolarizing noise bellow this threshold is corrected by the topologi-
cally protected code from [31].
4
Note that the round complexity of FK could be further reduced to linear, if one is willing to admit a higher upper bound for soundness.
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(Continued.)
Let ν denote a brickwork state encoding the graphG and containing one trap qubit, as explained in [1]. Let ν denote a fault tolerant
encoding of the graph ν using the topologically protected code from [31]. The encoding is done as explained in [36], hence ν will be
decorated lattices (seeﬁgures 1, 2 in [36]). The index ν denotes the randomness in the θ angles for the encoding as chosen by the veriﬁer.
Let N1 2   = ⊗ ⊗ ⋯ ⊗ν ν ν ν∼ , where R N R Olog ( ) log ( ) (1)cn
cn
cn
cn1 1
< < +− − , for some constants R 1> , c 2> and
{ }N1ν ν ν= ⋯∼ .Wewill refer to  ν∼ as a sequence of encodings.
Protocol
(1) The veriﬁer chooses R 1> and constructs the random set ν∼.
(2) The veriﬁer prepares the qubits for the sequence  ν∼ and sends them to the prover alongwith instructions on how to construct  ν∼.
(3) The veriﬁer sendsmeasurement instructions to the prover in order to compute the executions of the encoded graphs.
(4) The prover sends themeasurement outcomes to the veriﬁer.
(5) Steps 3 and 4 repeat until the veriﬁer either accepts or rejects.
The veriﬁer rejects if any of the traps fail. He takes the outcome of the computation to be themajority outcome over all computations
(graphs iν ).
It is evident that assuming faulty devices where each qubit behaves as if it crossed a partially depolarizing
channel, the completeness of the protocol becomes exponentially small (as function of the number of traps).
This is clearly unsatisfactory. The arguably simplest solutionwould be to alter the acceptance condition of the
protocol. Since it is unlikely that all trapmeasurements succeed, even for honest prover, the veriﬁer should
accept a result if the traps that succeed are above some ﬁxed fraction.
Lemma5.Assumewe run amodiﬁed FK protocol withNT traps and each qubit is subject to the action of a partially
depolarizing channel  having probability of error p 0> . Themodiﬁcation is that the veriﬁer accepts if there are
fewer than N p( )T ϵ+ mistakes at trapmeasurements, where 0ϵ > is a suitably chosen small number. The
completeness of this protocol is lower bounded by N1 exp( 2 )T2ϵ− − .
The abovemodiﬁcation resolves the issue raised regarding the completeness bound.However, if wewere to
make suchmodiﬁcation, we have the following consequence for the soundness of the protocol:
Lemma6.Assumewe run amodiﬁed FK protocol withNT traps,N qubits in total and each qubit is subject to the
action of a partially depolarizing channel  having probability of error p 0> . Themodiﬁcation is that the veriﬁer
accepts if there are fewer than N p( )T ϵ+ mistakes at trapmeasurements, where 0ϵ > is a suitably chosen small
number. The soundness of this protocol is upper bounded by
N
N
( )( )T 2
3
d2
5
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥.
Wecan see that introducing a threshold of acceptance leads to an increased bound on soundness. Again,
expected, sincewe allow the prover to tamperwith some of the traps (and, by extension, with the computation as
well) without rejecting the output. To solve these problemswe need to use a fault tolerant code. The FKprotocol
already uses a fault tolerant code to encode the computation graph.However this is done in order to boost the
value of the soundness parameter. The trap qubits are not encodedwith the code (only the computation is).
Thuswe propose amodiﬁed FKprotocol. This is described in protocol 5. In this protocol we encode both
computations and traps in a fault tolerant code and use sequential repetitions (also used in [17]). This leads to
ourﬁnalmain result:
Theorem4.Under the assumption of a faulty setting where qubit preparation and quantum gates are subject to
partially depolarizing noise having bounded probability p, protocol 5 is a valid veriﬁcation protocol having
completeness 1, soundness upper bounded by (1 2)R, where R is a constant such that R 1> . The protocol has round
complexityO n( )2 .
The proof of this theorem (and previous lemmas) are given in section 5. An important point tomake is that
the composite protocol we constructed can also bemade fault tolerant. To achieve this the state tomography
protocol should be run on top of a fault tolerant code. Asmentioned in [20], in principle, this is straightforward
for blind, veriﬁed computation, since the provers canwork on top of a quantum error-correcting code and
entanglement can be distilledwith the help of the veriﬁer [37, 38].
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3. Proof of robustness
In this sectionwe prove the robustness of the FKprotocol.We start by ﬁrst proving a simpler result, namely the
robustness of the protocol under the assumption that the input is uncorrelatedwith any external system.We
then remove this assumption and use our results to prove themain theorem, necessary for the compositionwith
the RUVprotocol.
Lemma7. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ϵ-close to the ideal input state and uncorrelated with any
external system, the soundness bound does not change.
Proof.Wewill follow the same proof technique as in [1] and show that the soundness bound does not change.
This is done by incorporating the assumption of a deviated input into that proof. The outcome density operator
of the protocol is denoted B ( )j ν , where ν denotes the veriﬁer’s choices of input variables and j ranges over the
prover’s choices of possible actions (j = 0 is the correct/honest action). If the outcome is incorrect itmeans that
all of the traps have passed, but the computation is not correct. This is associatedwith the following projection
operator [1]:
( )P . (4)
t T
t tincorrect ideal ideal
T TΨ Ψ η η= − ⊗ ν ν
∈

Here, ideal idealΨ Ψ∣ 〉〈 ∣ is the ideal output state, and t T t tT Tη η⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ν ν∈ is the state associatedwith the trap qubits.
Notice thatwe are projecting to a state inwhich the output is orthogonal to its ideal value, and the traps are
correct. This expresses the fact that the veriﬁerwill accept an incorrect computation. The associated probability
for that event is pincorrect and can be expressed as:
( )p p Tr P B( ) ( ) . (5)jincorrect incorrect∑ ν ν=
ν
ν
Which is a weighted average of the incorrect outcome probabilities (expressed by the trace operator) over all
possible input states. The outcome density operator can bewritten as:
)
( )B b c b C P
P C b b c
( ) Tr 0 0
. (6)
j P
b
r b
P b b
b r
,
Prover s qubits
, ,
Input state
Joint system state
† †
,
†
C
b
C
,⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟     
  
∑ν Ω Ψ Ψ
Ω
= + 〈 ∣ ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗
∣ 〉 +
ν ν ν
σ
ν
′
ν
Notice the following, as explained in [1]:
• we are tracing over the prover’s qubits;
• we have denoted the joint state, comprised of the input and the prover’s qubits, as b,σν ;
• j ranges over the prover’s possible strategies (j = 0 is the honest strategy);
• b indicates the possible branches of computation parametrized by themeasurement results sent by the prover
to the veriﬁer;
• cr indicates corrections that need to be performed on theﬁnal, classical output due to theMBQCcomputation
together with the randomphase introduced by the veriﬁer;
• P is the computation that wewant the prover to do;
• Ω is the prover’s deviation from the desired computation;
• C b,Cν are the corrections the prover applies to its quantumoutput depending on themeasurement outcomes
(as in themeasurement-basedmodel);
we nowneed to incorporate the approximate input state into this operator.Wewill not use the ϵ-closeness of the
deviated state to the ideal one, and prove a stronger result, that the soundness bound does not change regardless
of the input state. Concretely, assume the deviated input is:
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( ), (7)b b b, , ,ρ Ψ Ψ=ν ν ν
where  is a CPTPmapwhich represents any deviation from the ideal input state either from incorrect
preparation, amalicious prover or faulty devices. This is equivalent to applying some unitaryU to the input state
tensoredwith some environment qubits that are traced out.We can express thismathematically as:
( )( )( )U UTr 0 0 . (8)b E E b b, , , †ρ Ψ Ψ= ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ν ν ν
The joint system state b,σν becomes5:
( )( )( ) ( )U UTr 0 0 0 0 . (9)b E P E b b, , , †σ Ψ Ψ= ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ν ν ν
Let us consider a newunitaryV U( )= ⊗ . This allows us to rewrite the joint system state as:
( )( )( )V VTr 0 0 . (10)b E E P b b, , , †σ Ψ Ψ= ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ν ν ν+
Since P, the computation, is a unitary operator, theremust exists some unitaryV′ such thatV P V P†= ′ .
Substituting this into the previous expression gives us:
( )( )( )P V P P V PTr 0 0 . (11)b E E P b b, † , , † †σ Ψ Ψ= ′ ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ′ν ν ν+
Incorporating equation (11) into the expression for B ( )j ν in equation (6)we obtain:
( )( )( )
)
( )
B b c b C P
P V P P V P
P C b b c
( ) Tr
Tr 0 0
. (12)
j P
b
r b
E
E P b b
b r
,
† , , † †
† †
,
†
C
C
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜∑ν Ω
Ψ Ψ
Ω
= + 〈 ∣
′ ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ′
∣ 〉 +
ν
ν ν
ν
+
The assumption of the lemma is that the input state is not correlatedwith any external system.Hence, the
spacesE andP are independent. Thismeans that the prover’s deviation,Ω, is not acting onE and therefore we
can ‘push’ the inner trace operator to the beginning of the equation. Also using the fact that PP P P† †= = , we
obtain:
( )
)
( )
B b c b
C V P P V C
b b c
( ) Tr
0 0
. (13)
j P E
b
r
b
P E b b
b
r
,
, , † † †
,
†
C C
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜∑ν
Ω Ψ Ψ Ω
= + 〈 ∣
′ ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ′
∣ 〉 +
ν ν ν ν
+
+
Wecan now include the input deviation given byV′ into the prover deviationΩ, by considering VΩ Ω′ = ′.
This is possible becausewe are bounding the probability over all possible deviations,Ω, of the prover in the
computation and all possible deviations,V′, from the preparation part. Thus, we can consider this to be a single,
global, deviation given by Ω′.
( )
)
( )
B b c b
C P P C
b b c
( ) Tr
0 0
. (14)
j P E
b
r
b
P E b b
b
r
,
, , † †
,
†
C C
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜∑ν
Ω Ψ Ψ Ω
= + 〈 ∣
′ ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ′
∣ 〉 +
ν ν ν ν
+
+
As a result, the above equation has the same form as the undeviated input scenario of equation (6). This
makes sense since all we have done is to incorporate the deviation of the input into the prover’s cheating strategy.
The original proof continues as it is in [1], and the bound remains unchanged
p
2
3
. (15)incorrect
d2
5
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥
⩽
□
5
Here and in the following expressions we have used the fact that the partial trace is linear and can therefore bemoved outside.
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The type of robustness guaranteed by this lemma is not sufﬁcient to prove the security of any protocol that
composes RUVwith FK. For example if we use prover 2 of RUV to prepare the input of the FKprotocol for
prover 1, this input is in general correlatedwith prover 2ʼs system. To address this issue, we use from [20] the
following corollary of the gentlemeasurement lemma and the special Kraus representation in the presence of
initial correlations given in [33].
Corollary 1 [20]. Let ρ be a state on 1 2 ⊗ , and let π be a pure state on 1 . If for some 0δ ⩾ ,
Tr( Tr ) 12π ρ δ⩾ − , then
Tr 2 . (16)1 Trρ π ρ δ δ∣∣ − ⊗ ∣∣ ⩽ +
Lemma8. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ϵ-close to the ideal input state the soundness bound changes by
atmostO ( )ϵ .
Proof.Consider a composite correlated state ABρ where systemsA andB are not communicating and let
Tr ( )A B ABρ ρ= and Tr ( )B A ABρ ρ= . If Aρ is used as input for the FKprotocol, the existence of correlations (not
present in the previous lemma) can be exploited by an adversarial prover. Hence the deviation can no longer be
expressed as aCPTPmap over this subsystem. As it is shown in [33], in presence of initial correlations deﬁned as:
(17)AB A Bcorrρ ρ ρ ρ= − ⊗
the evolution of the subsystem Aρ is the following:
( ) . (18)A A Aρ ρ δρ→ +
Here  is a CPTPmap and Aδρ is an inhomogeneous termwhich is added to theCPTP evolution due to the
presence of initial correlations. In additionwe have the following property:
( )U UTr . (19)A B AB ABcorr †δρ ρ=
Wecan see that substituting Aρ in the outcome density operator of the FKprotocol gives different soundness
bound than the one in lemma 7. The difference stems from the extra δρ term.Howeverwe can use the fact that ρ
is ϵ-close to the ideal state (lemma assumption) to show that the normof Aδρ is atmost of orderO ( )ϵ . To
prove this weﬁrst ﬁnd a bound for the normof corrρ , and since Aδρ is just a CPTPmap applied to corrρ it follows
that the normof Aδρ has the same bound.Moreover, the action of the FKprotocol can bemodelled as aCPTP
map, therefore acting on Aδρ will not increase the norm. It follows that the overall soundness bound changes by
atmostO ( )ϵ .
If we denote the ideal state as ψ∣ 〉, we know that:
. (20)A Trρ ψ ψ ϵ∣∣ − ∣ 〉〈 ∣∣∣ ⩽
It is also known, from the relationship between ﬁdelity and trace distance, that:
1 . (21)A A Trψ ρ ψ ρ ψ ψ− 〈 ∣ ∣ 〉 ⩽ ∣∣ − ∣ 〉〈 ∣∣∣
Combining these two yields:
1 . (22)Aψ ρ ψ ϵ〈 ∣ ∣ 〉 ⩾ −
Recall that Tr( )A Aψ ψ ρ ψ ρ ψ∣ 〉〈 ∣ = 〈 ∣ ∣ 〉, using equation (22) and corollary 1 (where ρ is substitutedwith ABρ
and πwith ψ ψ∣ 〉〈 ∣) we have:
2 . (23)AB B Trρ ψ ψ ρ ϵ ϵ∣∣ − ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ∣∣ ⩽ +
The trace normof corrρ is simply the trace distance between ABρ and A Bρ ρ⊗ as can be seen from the deﬁnition.
Using the triangle inequality, we have:
. (24)AB A B AB B B A BTr Tr Trρ ρ ρ ρ ψ ψ ρ ψ ψ ρ ρ ρ∣∣ − ⊗ ∣∣ ⩽ ∣∣ − ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ ∣∣ + ∣∣∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ − ⊗ ∣∣
For the last term, using the additivity of trace distancewith respect to tensor product, we get:
. (25)B A B A B BTr Tr Trψ ψ ρ ρ ρ ψ ψ ρ ρ ρ ϵ∣∣∣ 〉〈 ∣ ⊗ − ⊗ ∣∣ ⩽ ∣∣∣ 〉〈 ∣ − ∣∣ + ∣∣ − ∣∣ =
Combining these last three inequalities we obtain:
2 2 . (26)AB A B Trρ ρ ρ ϵ ϵ∣∣ − ⊗ ∣∣ ⩽ +
Since 0 1ϵ⩽ ⩽ , the bound is of orderO ( )ϵ .We have therefore bounded the normof corrρ and thus the norm
of Aδρ .
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Wecannow take our expression for the deviated input from equation (18) and substitute it into equation (8),
from lemma 7. Since trace is a linear operation, it will result in the addition of an inhomogeneous term to each
equation that involves the outcome density operator. But since the inhomogeneous termhas bounded trace
norm, and the action of the outcome density operator is trace preserving, it follows that we obtain the same
bound as in lemma 7with the addition of an extra termof orderO ( )ϵ . This concludes the proof. □
Lemma9. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ϵ-close to the ideal input state, the completeness is lower
bounded by 1 2ϵ− .
Proof. In the simplest sense, the FK protocol can be abstractly thought of as a CPTPmap  , that takes some
input state to an output state. Sincewe are assuming the prover is honest, the output state will be B ( )0 ν .
However, this is in the case where the input is assumed to be ideal.We are dealingwith a deviated input, hence
our output state will be B ( )0 ν′ .Writing these out explicitly we have:
( )B ( ) , (27)0 ν Ψ Ψ= ν ν
( )B ( ) , (28)0 ν ρ′ = ν
where, ρν is the deviated input, and by assumption
. (29)Trρ Ψ Ψ ϵ∥ − ∥ ⩽ν ν ν
Note that in the followingwe do not need to consider nonCPTPmap evolution since the provers are assumed to
behave honestly. Hence even in the presence of initial correlation, the subsystemwill evolve according to the
desiredCPTPmap of the protocol. However CPTPmaps cannot increase the trace distance, which leads to:
B B( ) ( ) . (30)0 0 Tr Trν ν Ψ Ψ ρ ϵ∥ − ′ ∥ ⩽ ∥ − ∥ ⩽ν ν ν
This also applies for projection operators and if in particular we consider Pcorrect, the projection onto the correct
output state, we also have that:
P B P B B B( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . (31)correct 0 correct 0 Tr 0 0 Trν ν ν ν ϵ∥ − ′ ∥ ⩽ ∥ − ′ ∥ ⩽
Nextwe use the reverse triangle inequality, which gives us:
P B P B P B P B( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . (32)correct 0 Tr correct 0 Tr correct 0 correct 0 Trν ν ν ν ϵ∥ ∥ − ∥ ′ ∥ ⩽ ∥ − ′ ∥ ⩽
And sincewe are dealingwith positive deﬁnite operators, we know that:
( )P B P B( ) 1
2
Tr ( ) , (33)correct 0 Tr correct 0ν ν∥ ∥ =
( )P B P B( ) 1
2
Tr ( ) . (34)correct 0 Tr correct 0ν ν∥ ′ ∥ = ′
But P BTr( ( )) 1correct 0 ν = (the completeness whenwe have ideal input), so:
( )P B1 Tr ( ) 2 . (35)correct 0 ν ϵ− ′ ⩽
Lastly, becauseTr P B( ( )) 1correct 0 ν′ ⩽ , we get:
( )Tr P B1 2 ( ) . (36)correct 0ϵ ν− ⩽ ′
Thus, the probability of accepting a correct outcome, under the assumption that the input state is ϵ-close to the
ideal input, is greater than1 2ϵ− . □
It is now easy to see that the proof of theorem 1 follows directly fromdeﬁnition 3 and lemmas 8 and 9.
Having the robustness property, the FKprotocol can receive an input, which is ϵ-close to its ideal value, from
another protocol. Aswe have shown, even if this input is correlated with an external system,we can still perform
the veriﬁcation as long aswe have ϵ-closeness.
4. Proof of compositionality
Toprove the security of the composite protocol (theorem3), weﬁrst need to prove that the FKprotocol rejects
with high probability a state close to a reﬂection about theXY-plane (lemma 10). Thenwe prove that the
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modiﬁed state tomography protocol (protocol 3), satisﬁes the ϵ-closeness property required by the (robust) FK.
This is achieved by showing lemmas 11 and 12. Finally we give the proof of theorem3.
Lemma10. If the initial input state of the FK protocol is ϵ-close to a reﬂection about theXY-plane of the ideal input
state, the protocol will reject it with high probability.
Proof. First we note that the input to the FKprotocol consists of XY -plane states and dummyqubits which are
either 0∣ 〉or 1∣ 〉. TheXY-plane states are invariant under the reﬂection, while the dummy states will beﬂipped.
Assume that there is a trap that has an odd number of (dummy) neighbours. The veriﬁer knows that he sent the
state ∣ + 〉θ and expects tomake aZ correction if the number of 1∣ 〉neighbours is odd.However, if instead of
what the veriﬁer expects, there is an overall reﬂectionwith respect to theXY-plane, then for each of the
neighbours of the trap therewill be a newZ correction (the 0∣ 〉will become 1∣ 〉 inducing aZ, while the 1∣ 〉will
become 0∣ 〉undoing the previousZ correction, which is equivalent with anotherZ correction since Z 12 = ).
Therefore, if the neighbours of a trap are odd in number, hewill expect the exact opposite result andwill
deterministically detect the deviation. For this to happen it sufﬁces that the veriﬁermakes sure that at least one
trap has odd number of neighbours, something that can be easily achieved. Therefore, the FKprotocol will
always reject the reﬂected ideal input state. Given that the input is ϵ-close to this, we have shown in lemma 8 that
the outcome density operator changes by atmostO ( )ϵ from its ideal value. Thus, the output state isO ( )ϵ
close to the reﬂected ideal input state. It follows that the protocol will reject this statewith atmost probability
O1 ( )ϵ− . □
In proving the correctness of our protocol weﬁrst need to show the correctness of themodiﬁed state
tomography protocol. Herewe focus on themain results that we use for showing the correctness and security of
this protocol.We start with a theorem from [20]:
Theorem5 [20]. Fix { , , }1 2
q π π= … a complete, orthonormal set of q-qubit XZ-determined pure states. For a
sufﬁciently large constant α and for sufﬁciently large n, letm m n qn( )= ⩾ and N m 1⩾ α− . Let m[ ]qnσ ∈ be a list
of distinct indices. Consider a combination of the following two protocols between the veriﬁer, Eve, and the provers,
Alice and Bob.
(1)CHSH games: in the ﬁrst protocol, Eve referees Nm sequential CHSH games. She accepts if
{ }j Nm A B X Y Nm Nm Nm[ ]: cos ( 8) log( ) . (37)j j j j 2 12 2π∈ = ⊕ ⩾ −
(2)State tomography: in the second protocol, Eve chooses K N[ ]∈ uniformly at random. She referees K m( 1)−
CHSH games. For the Kth set, she referees a state tomography protocol with parameters q, n,m, and σ. She
accepts if the following criteria are satisﬁed:
{ }j O o n n nmax # : 2 4 log (38)
o
j
q q
2q⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
= − ⩽
∈
( )P n nmax Tr 4 (log ) . (39)
o P I X Z
o P o q
2 , { , , }
,
q q⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
τ π− ⩽
∈ ∈ ⊗
The combined protocol satisﬁes the following completeness and soundness conditions:
Completeness: if Alice and Bob use Nm shared EPR states to play the CHSH games according to an ideal strategy,
and if Bob uses an ideal strategy with respect to the projections on the Kth set ofmEPR states in the state
tomography protocol, then in both protocols
( )O nPr[Eve accepts] 1 . (39)1 2⩾ − −
Soundness: assume that for both protocols, nPr(Eve accepts) 1 1 3⩾ − − . Let ρ be Alice’s state in the second
protocol after K m( 1)− games and conditioned on Bob’smessagesO O, , n1 … . Then there exists an isometry
: ( )A A m A
2C  ↪ ⊗ ′⊗ such that letting j,ρσ be A A† ρ reduced to Alice’s qubits j i i q{ ( , ): [ ]}σ ∈ ,
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{ } ( )( ) ( ) ( )j n O n O n n nPr [ ]: Tr 1 1 1 4 . (40)j O, 1 16 1 16 1 12j⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ρ π∈ ⩾ − ⩾ − ⩾ −σ − − −
Here, the probability is over K, the ﬁrst K m( 1)− games andO O, , n1 … .
Wegive the following corollary to this theorem:
Corollary 2.By changing themeasurement operators accordingly, a state tomography protocol for q-qubitXY-
determined (YZ -determined) states exists, and achieves the same completeness and soundness bound as the one from
theorem 5.
Proof.Asmentioned, if we consider the extendedCHSH game (comprising of six CHSHgames) and try to
rigidly determine the existence of a tensor product of Ψ∣ 〉+ states, we can ﬁx the strategies of the provers up to an
XY plane reﬂection. In particular, the results of an XZ state tomography in the original setting hold here for XY
(YZ ) tomography. Therefore, it is possible to certify the preparation of q-qubitXY-determined (YZ -
determined) states. □
Wecan nowpresent themain lemma proving that protocol 3 is a veriﬁcation protocol.
Lemma11.Protocol 3 has completeness lower bounded by O n1 ( )1 2− − and soundness upper bounded by
O n( )1 12− .
Proof.According to corollary 2, the six state tomography protocols that constitute protocol 3 are valid
veriﬁcation protocols achieving the same bounds for completeness and soundness as the original protocol from
theorem5.Wewill ignore the case of XY plane reﬂections since, as we have shown in lemma 10, these are
detectedwith overwhelming probability by the FKprotocol. These protocols can be ‘stitched’ together in the
sameway the subprotocols of the RUVprotocol are stitched together. In fact, our case requires amuch simpler
analysis since the six state tomography protocols are independent of each other. Thismeans that in each
subprotocol, the veriﬁer is not basing his questions on the results of any previous subprotocol. This nonadaptive
technique contrasts the RUVprotocol inwhich the questions were adaptive. In the case of honest provers, the
veriﬁer accepts if all subprotocols succeed. For each one, we know from theorem5 that the probability of
acceptance is O n1 ( )1 2⩾ − − , hence for thewhole protocol the probability of acceptance is
O n O n(1 ( )) 1 ( )1 2 6 1 2⩾ − = −− − . Thus, we see that the completeness bound remains unchanged. For
soundness, assuming the provers are dishonest we know, again from theorem 5, that the probability of accepting
an incorrect outcome is n4 1 12⩽ − . In our protocol, the provers can be dishonest in any of the six subprotocols,
therefore, by a union bound the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome is n n6 · 4 241 12 1 12⩽ =− − .
Therefore, we can say that the soundness of our protocol is upper bounded byO n( )1 12− . □
Weare now able to give the proof of ourmain result (theorem 3)which concerns the properties of the
composite protocol (protocol 4). To do this, we require an additional property.
Lemma12.Assume the veriﬁer wants to prepare a state ρ consisting of tensor products of qubits which are all
determined in either the XZ , XY or YZ bases. A successful run of protocol 3 certiﬁes that, prover 1 has a state ρ′ such
that ρ and ρ′ are close in trace distance.
Proof.The proof is partially given in [20]. In the state tomography protocol, a prover preparesmultiple copies of
a resource state. In [20] it is stated that if the veriﬁer accepts, then, with high probability, a subset of states of the
prover are close in trace distance to copies of the resource state.
The soundness condition of theorem 5 states that:
{ } ( )( ) ( ) ( )j n O n O n n nPr [ ]: Tr 1 1 1 4 . (41)j O, 1 16 1 16 1 12j⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ρ π∈ ⩾ − ⩾ − ⩾ −σ − − −
It is shown in [20] that this condition translates to the fact that with probability at least O n1 ( )1 48− − wehave:
( ) ( )O O n (42)S n j S O1, Tr 1 64jρ π∥ − ⊗ ∥ ⩽∈ −
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Where S is uniformly random subset of sizeO n( )1 64 . If we denoteO n( )1 64− as ϵ,O n( )1 48− as p, O( )S n1,ρ as ρϵ
and j S
Ojπ⊗ ∈ as idρ then the state ρ′, that prover 1 has, is:
( )p p I(1 ) . (43)ρ ρ ρ′ = − + −ϵ ϵ
Wecan see that, for sufﬁciently large n, the values of p and ϵ tend to 0. Consequently, ρ′ approaches ρϵ and ρϵ
approaches the ideal state, idρ . Computing the trace distance between ρ′ and idρ , we obtain:
( ) ( )p p I p I(1 ) 2 . (44)id id idTr Tr Tr Trρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ∥ ′ − ∥ = ∥ − + − − ∥ ⩽ ∥ − ∥ + ∥ − ∥ϵ ϵ ϵ ϵ
Andusing inequality (42), we have:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )O n p O n O n O n2 . (45)id Tr 1 64 1 64 1 48 1 64ρ ρ∥ ′ − ∥ ⩽ + = + =− − − −
Therefore, the state that prover 1 has, conditioned on hismessagesO n1, , is close to the state comprised of copies
of the resource states. Depending onwhich type of state tomography is done, the resource states are determined
in either theXZ,XY orYZ bases. □
Proof of theorem3.According to lemmas 11 and 12, protocol 3 is capable of preparing with high probability, a
multi-qubit state ρ on prover 1ʼs side, such that ρ is ϵ-close to a tensor product of states determined in either the
XZ,XY orYZ bases. In fact, each subprotocol is capable of such a preparation. For the twoXY state tomography
protocols we choose the resource state to be:
. (46)4 2 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 7 4∣ + 〉 ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ +π π π π π π π
For the twoXZ state tomography protocols we choose the resource state to be:
0 1 0 1 . (47)∣ 〉 ⊗ ∣ 〉 ⊗ ∣ 〉 ⊗ ∣ 〉
This allows us to preparemulti-qubit states on prover 1ʼs sidewhich are close in trace distance to the FK input
consisting ofXY-plane states and dummyqubits (the 0∣ 〉, 1∣ 〉qubits). If we denote as 1ρ themulti-qubit state
consisting ofmultiple copies of theXY resource state and 2ρ as themulti-qubit state consisting ofmultiple copies
of theXZ resource state, then the FK input is effectively 1 2ρ ρ⊗ . Lemma 12 shows that with high probability
prover 1will have a state 1ρ′ that is prepϵ -close to 1ρ and a state 2ρ′ that is prepϵ -close to 2ρ , where
O n( )prep 1 64ϵ = − . Therefore, 1 2ρ ρ′ ⊗ ′ is 2 prepϵ -close to 1 2ρ ρ⊗ .Moreover, in [20] it is proven in the state
tomography protocol prover 1 is completely blind regarding his state. Given this, and using theorem 1,we can
compose themodiﬁed state tomography protocol (protocol 3) with the FKprotocol to achieve a newblind
veriﬁcation protocol. The state 1 2ρ ρ′ ⊗ ′ is used as input for the FKprotocol, since it is ϵ-close to the ideal input,
where 2 prepϵ ϵ= .
The bound on completeness for the new protocol can be computed from the completeness bounds of the
constituent protocols. In the honest provers setting, the veriﬁer’s acceptance probability formodiﬁed state
tomography is O n1 ( )1 2− − , and for FKwith deviated input it is O O n1 ( ) 1 ( )1 128ϵ− = − − .Multiplying
these together and taking the leading order termsweﬁnd that completeness of the protocol is upper bounded by
O n1 ( )1 128− − .
For soundness, in the dishonest setting if the veriﬁerwould reject in eithermodiﬁed state tomography or FK
then hewould reject in the newprotocol as well. The bound on soundness formodiﬁed state tomography is
O n( )1 12− and for FK is ( )2
3
d2
5
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥, where d is the security parameter of the FK protocol that speciﬁes the size of the
encoding for the computation graph. From aunion boundwe get that the soundness for our composite
approach is O n( ) ( )2
3
1 12d25
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥ + − .
The last part of the proof deals with the round complexity of our composite approach. In the previous
proof of lemma 12wementioned that prover 1ʼs state restricted to subset ofO n( )1 64 qubits is close in trace
distance to the ideal state. However we need n to be sufﬁciently large so that this subset of qubits can
encompass the entire FK input.We know that the FK input comprises ofO ( )2∣ ∣ qubits, where  is the
computation the veriﬁer wants to perform. Thismeans, that we needO ( )128∣ ∣ qubits in total so that we can
claim that a state ofO ( )2∣ ∣ qubits is close to its intended value. Recall that from thereom 5, the number of
rounds for state tomography isO n( )α , where we know from [20] that 16α > . Thismeans that the total
number of roundsmust beO ( )c∣ ∣ , where c 128 · 16 2048> = . If we relabel n to be ∣ ∣ then the round
complexity isO n( )c . □
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5. Proof of fault tolerance
Themain result of this section is the proof of theorem4 that gives a fault tolerant FKprotocol.Weﬁrst prove
lemmas 3–6 that as stressed in section 2.3, highlights whywe cannot use results similar to the robustness andwhy
the simplest approaches fail. Thenwe proceed in the proof of theorem4.
Proof of lemma 3.Wecan compute a bound on the trace distance between an arbitrary qubit iρ and ( )i ρ :
p p X Y Z X Y Z( ) (1 ) ( 3)([ ] [ ] [ ]) ([ ] [ ] [ ]) , (48)i i i i iTr Trρ ρ ρ ρ ρ∥ − ∥ = ∥ − − − + + + + ∥
p X Y Z X Y Z( ) (1 3)([ ] [ ] [ ]) ([ ] [ ] [ ]) . (49)i i i iTr Trρ ρ ρ ρ∥ − ∥ = ∥ − + + + + ∥
Butwe know that the trace distance is upper bounded by 1, so:
p( ) . (50)i i Trρ ρ∥ − ∥ ⩽
Nowwe compute the trace distance between i
n
i1σ ρ= ⊗ = and ( )in i1 σ ρ′ = ⊗ = :
np( ) ( ) . (51)i
n
i i
n
i
i
n
i iTr 1 1 Tr
1
Tr ∑σ σ ρ ρ ρ ρ∥ − ′ ∥ = ∥ ⊗ − ⊗ ∥ ⩽ ∥ − ∥ ⩽= =
=
Since the trace distance is upper bounded by 1 and since np can exceed 1 for sufﬁciently large n, we have:
npmin(1, ). (52)Trσ σ∥ − ′ ∥ ⩽
Consider 0 0i
n
1σ = ⊗ ∣ 〉〈 ∣= . Under the action of the depolarizing channel the trace distance between σ and σ′ is
n 0 0 ( 0 0 ) Tr∥∣ 〉〈 ∣ − ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ∥ . However 0 0 ( 0 0 ) pTr 23∥∣ 〉〈 ∣ − ∣ 〉〈 ∣ ∥ = , therefore the distance between σ and σ′ is
n
p2
3
. For sufﬁciently large n this can clearly reach themaximumvalue of 1. □
Proof of lemma 4.Because of the action of the partially depolarizing channel, each trap qubit has a probability p
of being changed.Wemake the simplifying assumption that an affected qubit will produce awrong
measurement result. This assumption is only valid for completeness, wherewe assume that the devices are
honest but faulty6.We then have that the probability of a trapmeasurement producing a correct outcome is
upper bounded by p1 − . Given that trapmeasurements are independent of each other, and assumingwe have
NT traps, the probability that all trapmeasurements produce correct outcomes is upper bounded by p(1 )NT− .
Since the veriﬁer accepts if and only if all trapmeasurements succeed it follows that the completeness is upper
bounded by p(1 )NT− . □
Proof of lemma 5.Deﬁne the following Bernoulli randomvariable:
X
t1, if measurement of trap fails,
0, otherwise.
(53)t
⎛
⎝⎜=
Under the simplifying assumption of the previous lemma, we have X pPr( 1) 0t = = ⩾ . Next, we deﬁne:
F X . (54)
t
N
t
1
T
∑=
=
It is clear that E F N p( ) T= . Additionally, using aHoeffding inequality, we have that:
( ) ( )F p N NPr ( ) exp 2 . (55)T T2ϵ ϵ⩾ + ⩽ −
This gives the probability that the number of failed traps is greater than our threshold of pNT. The complement
of this is the completeness, which is therefore bounded by N1 exp( 2 )T2ϵ− − □
6
If the devices were dishonest, wewould need to take into account the deviation on the trap qubits resulting frommalevolent behaviour.
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Proof of lemma 6.Recall that soundness is the probability of accepting an incorrect outcome. In the original FK
protocol thismeant that all the traps succeeded but the computation output was orthogonal to the correct
output. This is expressedwith the projector P PT⊗⊥ . Here P⊥ projects the computation output onto the
orthogonal state andPT projects the trap outputs onto the correct outputs. If the accepting condition is given by
a threshold of correct traps, the projectormust change accordingly. Thismeans that there should not be only one
trap projector but one for each accepting situation. Taking the threshold to be pNT means that the veriﬁer
accepts ifT N pNT T= − traps succeeded. Since these traps can be any combination ofT out of the possibleNT,
there are
N
T
T⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠ possible accepting situations. Therefore, the trap projectorPTbecomes a sumof
N
T
T⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠ projectors
(one for each accepting choice of traps). It therefore follows from linearity that the soundness bound becomes
( )NT
T 2
3
d2
5⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
⎡⎢ ⎤⎥
.
□
Proof of theorem4. In [36],Morimae and Fujii showhow a blind quantum computation can bemade fault
tolerant by encoding it in a topologically protected error-correcting code [31]. The encoding then uses a
decoration trick so that the prover only needs to performXY-planemeasurements and this can be done blindly
using theUBQCprotocol in [1]. Here, we use the same idea to encode a computationwhich also contains an
isolated trap. This follows from theﬁrst veriﬁcation protocol introduced in [1]which uses a brickwork state to
perform the computation. Encoding this in the fault tolerant code give us the lattice ν, which according to [36]
can be executed blindly by the prover.
Throughout the run of the protocol, if the prover is always honest then the fault tolerant codewill correct for
any errors (sincewe have assumed the error rate is smaller than the threshold of correctable errors). This proves
that the completeness of the protocol is 1.
To compute the soundness, note that the computed bound for the brickwork state protocol in [1] is:
p
n
1
1
2
, (56)incorrect ⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠< −
where n is the number of qubits in the brickwork state. Similar to the robustness proof, the proof of this bound
assumes that the outcome density operator of the protocol is projected onto a state where the trap succeeded but
the computation outcome is incorrect. It is can been shown that the same bound as the non-fault tolerant case
holds. Thismeans thatwe have:
p
n
1
1
2
, (57)incorrect ⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠< − ′
where n′ is the number of qubits in a lattice iν , out of theN lattices used in the protocol.We note that n′ is of the
same order as n [31], andwe can choose a constant c 2> such that n cn2 ′ = . In protocol 5 the veriﬁer creates
independent encodings ν, each depending on classical randomness. He accepts the sequence of encodings if all
trapmeasurements succeed in each encoding. Thismeans that the prover can deceive the veriﬁer if he can deviate
the computation in each encoding ν while at the same time passing all the traps.However, for any given
encodingwe know that the probability of this happening is given by pincorrect, and because of independence, the
prover will succeed for the sequencewith probability:
p
cn
1
1
. (58)N
N
incorrect
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠< −
Weknow that N R
cn
cn
1 log(
1
)>
−
. However, this is equivalent to:
N R
cn
1 log 1
1
, (59)⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠> − −
N R
cn
( )log 1
1
1. (60)⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠− < −
Note that we used the fact that
cn
log(1
1
) 0− < . Through exponentiationwe get:
cn
1
1 1
2
. (61)
N R
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠− <
Andwe ﬁnally obtain:
p
1
2
. (62)N
Rincorrect
<
Hence, the probability that the prover deceives the veriﬁer is less than (1 2)R and so the soundness of the
protocol is upper bounded by this value.
20
New J. Phys. 17 (2015) 083040 AGheorghiu et al
Lastly we compute the round complexity of this protocol. For the given sequence we haveN encodings and
for each encodingwe haveO(n) qubits7 and a corresponding round complexity ofO(n) to compute the
execution of that encoding. It follows that the overall complexity isO(Nn). Butwe know that
N R
cn
Olog 1
1
1
(1)⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠< + − + , and given thatR is a constant, we can show thatN isO(n). This follows from
the observation that dividing the function
cn
1 log 1
1
1
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠+ − with cn( 1)− gives a constant in the n → ∞
limit:
cn
cn
lim ( 1)log 1
1
1
1
ln 2
(63)
n
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠− + − =→∞
Incorporating this result yields overall complexityO n( )2 . Note that this proof techniqueworks for the case of
classical output sincewe are interested in the classical output of each encoding. The encodings are independent
from each other, which allows us to bound the probability for thewhole sequence. □
6. Conclusion
Wehave shown that the single server universal veriﬁable blind quantum computing protocol of [1] is robust
even against general adversaries. This protocol is currently the optimal protocol in terms of the veriﬁer’s
requirements. The robustness result further strengthens the scheme for realistic applications where the effect of
noisy devices should also be considered, as highlighted in a recent experimental demonstration of the protocol
[17].Moreover, it enables us to compose the FKprotocol with other quantum veriﬁcation protocols, extend it to
the entangled servers setting andmake it device independent. The key property that we proved, is that the
protocol remains secure even against correlated attacks. To achieve this, we considered the deviation of the
evolution of a correlated subsystem from the evolution of uncorrelated subsystems. The former could bewritten
mathematically as a non-CPTPmapwhich differs from aCPTPmap by an inhomogeneous term.However, for
inputs which are ϵ-close to the ideal FK input, we showed that this deviation (the inhomogeneous term) is
bounded by a termof orderO ( )ϵ . Our proof technique is generic and can be potentially applied to other
multi-party protocols where sequential composition is required. This result complements the local-veriﬁability
proof of [27]which is based on the universal composability framework. The latter, in its current form, is
insufﬁcient for composing entanglement-based protocols, such as RUV,with the FKprotocol because of the
possibility of correlated attacks. Our robustness result, however, leads to a stand alone secure composite
veriﬁcation protocol. Additionaly, the proposed composition scheme could potentially be used to extend the
composable framework of [27] to incorporatemultiple provers.
Our proposed composite protocol achieves veriﬁcationwith a classical client (device independence) and
gives improved round complexity in comparison to the RUVprotocol. It uses only the (modiﬁed) state
tomography part of RUV as input for the FKprotocol. The improved round complexity of the composite
protocol is still too high to allow for any practical implementation in the near future. However, the reason for
this high round complexity is the state tomography subprotocol and therefore, any improvement on how to
prepare the FK inputs (e.g. by exploiting the shared entanglement of the provers or using self-testing techniques
as in [23])will directly improve the efﬁciency of our composite protocol as well.
Finally we outlined how tomake our veriﬁcation protocol fault tolerant. To do sowe constructed a fault
tolerant version of the FKprotocol which is interesting in its own right. This complements thework presented in
[36]which addresses the fault tolerance of a (non-veriﬁable) blind quantum computing protocol.We used the
same topological error correcting code as [36] and a sequential repetition scheme in order to correct for faulty
devices.
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